edfb4c44b8
Add the building blocks the provisioning CLI renders per site. Base images (site-templates/images): - php-fpm: non-root (www-data) php:<ver>-fpm-alpine with pdo_mysql, mysqli, gd, intl, zip, opcache, exif; tuned php.ini + pool; built per PHP version. - nginx: hardened nginx:1.27-alpine with shared security + fastcgi snippets; per-site server block mounted at runtime. - build.sh: build + Trivy-scan (+ optional push) for both images. Profile templates (site-templates/profiles), Jinja2 rendered: - static, redirect (tiny nginx 301/302), custom-php (nginx + our php-fpm, optional DB), wordpress (nginx + official wordpress-fpm, DB required, upload-exec denied). Only nginx carries Traefik labels and joins proxy; php-fpm uses the private <slug>_net and joins platform only when a DB is needed. Secrets stay in a git-ignored .env, not the compose. CI: .forgejo/workflows/images.yml builds/scans images (gitleaks + Trivy). README documents the render context and the Phase 4 web-root ownership item. Templates validated: all profiles render to valid compose YAML across the database on/off branches and single/multi-domain host rules. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
13 lines
328 B
Text
13 lines
328 B
Text
# Shared hardening rules, included by every site server block.
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# Deny dotfiles (e.g. .git, .env, .htaccess) except ACME well-known.
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location ~ /\.(?!well-known).* {
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deny all;
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access_log off;
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log_not_found off;
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}
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# Block common sensitive files.
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location ~* \.(engine|inc|ini|log|sh|sql|conf|bak)$ {
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deny all;
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}
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